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Abstract—The security of applications hinges on the trustwor-
thiness of the operating system, as applications rely on the OS
to protect code and data. As a result, multiple protections for
safeguarding the integrity of kernel code and data are being
continuously proposed and deployed. These existing protections,
however, are far from ideal as they either provide partial
protection, or require complex and high overhead hardware and
software stacks.
In this work, we present Neverland: a low-overhead, hardware-
assisted, memory protection scheme that safeguards the operating
system from rootkits and kernel-mode malware. Once the system
is done booting, Neverland’s hardware takes away the operating
system’s ability to overwrite certain configuration registers, as
well as portions of its own physical address space that contain
kernel code and security-critical data. Furthermore, it prohibits
the CPU from fetching privileged code from any memory region
lying outside the physical addresses assigned to the OS kernel and
drivers (regardless of virtual page permissions). This combination
of protections makes it extremely hard for an attacker to
tamper with the kernel or introduce new privileged code into
the system – even in the presence of kernel vulnerabilities. Our
evaluations show that the extra hardware required to support
these protections incurs minimal silicon and energy overheads.
Neverland enables operating systems to reduce their attack
surface without having to rely on complex integrity monitoring
software or hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security mechanisms on a computer system heavily rely
on the proper functioning of the OS kernel. If the kernel
is compromised, other protections built on top of it can be
bypassed.
Today’s systems commonly employ a secure boot mech-
anism to prevent the system from booting into a tampered
kernel. However, once the boot process is completed, attackers
could exploit software vulnerabilities to perform malicious
actions such as overwriting kernel memory, executing malware
in kernel-mode, or disabling driver integrity checks (example
attacks can be seen in [64, 8, 16, 41, 62, 54, 48, 44]).
Completely eliminating vulnerabilities from today’s large and
complex kernels remains impractical. For example, in 2017
alone, more than 200 Linux kernel vulnerabilities have been
disclosed (based on the data from the National Vulnerability
Database1). Clearly, today’s operating systems have a large
attack surface as a result of their size and complexity. Fur-
thermore, kernel modules (drivers) introduce additional attack
surface, as they have full access to the kernel’s address space.
1https://nvd.nist.gov/. Vendor: “linux”, Product:“linux kernel”, Keyword:
“linux kernel”
Ongoing Challenges of Protecting the Kernel
Recognizing their vast attack surface, a growing number
of operating systems are deployed along with a continuous
kernel integrity monitoring/enforcement mechanism. Android
distributions from major mobile vendors and recent versions
of Microsoft Windows are two notable operating systems that
have adopted this approach [66, 7, 5].
These integrity checking mechanisms typically monitor
kernel memory and CPU configuration registers to prevent
malicious modifications. Furthermore, they impose additional
restrictions on the system, such as disallowing writable code
pages in the kernel’s address space. Continuous integrity
monitoring makes compromising the kernel quite challenging
– even in the presence of software vulnerabilities.
Guarding the Guardians. If integrity enforcement mech-
anisms run at the same privilege level as the kernel they
are meant to protect, then vulnerabilities in the kernel could
be exploited to subvert the integrity enforcement mechanism
itself. For example, a kernel bug has previously been exploited
to bypass Microsoft’s Kernel Patch Protection (KPP) feature
[1].
To shield these protection mechanisms from a compromised
kernel, numerous previous works have proposed leveraging
virtualization support available in today’s systems [17, 22, 33,
60, 55, 50, 12]. With this approach, the main OS runs on top
of a hypervisor, while kernel protections are implemented in
a hypervisor or another separate virtualized operating system.
This provides additional protection as the hypervisor and the
virtualized operating systems are isolated by the hardware.
Microsoft Windows 10 has adopted this approach to protect
its driver and kernel integrity enforcement mechanisms [66].
Alternatively, it is possible to leverage trusted execution
environments, such as the TrustZone execution environment
which is available on ARM CPUs. Programs that run under
TrustZone are isolated and protected from the rest of the
system at the hardware level [38]. Android devices commonly
take advantage of TrustZone to isolate the kernel integrity
mechanisms from the main kernel [5, 7].
Even with the extra hardware-level isolation, software vul-
nerabilities in the kernel integrity enforcement mechanisms
themselves remain exploitable. For instance, attacks against
multiple generations of TrustZone-based kernel protections
have been shown [42, 7]. In addition, virtualization-based
security relies on hypervisors, which themselves have a large
attack surface – as proven by serious vulnerabilities that
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continue to be discovered in hypervisors [43, 45, 46, 47].
Furthermore, running operating systems on top of a restrictive
hypervisor incurs performance overheads [63, 26]
Hardware Mechanisms for Safeguarding Kernel Integrity
In this work, we present an efficient hardware-based pro-
tection, dubbed Neverland, which can be used to harden the
operating system against kernel-mode malware and rootkits.
Neverland does not rely on a complex (and potentially vul-
nerable) kernel integrity monitoring software and incurs zero
runtime performance overhead.
Once the kernel boots, Neverland’s hardware irreversibly
takes away the operating system’s ability to overwrite certain
configuration registers and portions of the physical address
space. More specifically, we “lock” the kernel’s code and
read-only sections, security-critical configurations (e.g., driver
signing configuration flags, system call table), and CPU con-
figuration registers that store kernel entry points. These locked
registers and memory regions can only be modified after
rebooting the system. Neverland also prohibits the CPU from
fetching kernel-mode code from any memory region lying
outside the physical addresses assigned to the OS kernel and
drivers (regardless of virtual page permissions).
Note that the code, data, and registers mentioned above are
guarded or periodically scanned by a typical kernel integrity
monitor. Locking these components at the hardware-level
obviates the need to continuously run an integrity monitoring
software.
We use a hardware permission table to mark portions of
the physical address space as read-only, executable, privileged,
and locked. On every instruction fetch and load/store, the CPU
checks the permission table to determine the legality of the
memory operations.
A number of embedded CPU architectures specify a form
of (optional) physical memory permission tables (e.g., ARM
MPU and RISC-V PMP specifications). These ISA exten-
sions are normally used to implement a lightweight memory
protection scheme in low-resource microcontrollers that do
not have virtual memory support [3, 13]. CPUs with virtual
memory support do not generally implement these physical
memory permission schemes. The hardware support required
by Neverland is a variation of such permission tables. We
leverage immutable hardware tables to provide low-overhead
operating system protections – without requiring complex
integrity monitoring software that rely on hypervisors or
trusted execution environments. In addition, we also introduce
the notion of “locked” CPU configuration registers to prevent
interrupt and system call hijacking.
Maintaining a separate physical address permission table
has advantages over existing hardware-level privilege escala-
tion defenses such as Intel Supervisor Mode Execution and
Access Prevention (SMEP and SMAP) and ARM Privileged-
eXecute-Never (PXN). SMEP/SMAP and PXN are under the
total control of the operating system and can be disabled if
the kernel is compromised. Neverland side-steps this issue by
stripping away the operating system’s ability to overwrite the
permission table entries once the boot process is complete.
Furthermore, since the physical address permission tables do
not rely on virtual page permissions, attacks that manipulate
the page table entries [41] are prevented.
We validated the efficacy of these protections by prototyp-
ing the hardware extensions in Spike (the official RISC-V
emulator) and running a minimally modified version of the
Linux kernel on the emulator. Our evaluations based on RTL
simulation and synthesis show that the hardware extensions
required by Neverland incur minimal silicon and energy cost,
and that integrating the proposed protections does not incur
any performance overhead beyond the 10s of milliseconds that
are required to setup permissions at boot time.
In summary, we make the following contributions towards
safeguarding the operating system’s memory (code/data) from
kernel-mode malware and rootkits:
• We present a hardware-based memory protection scheme
that can protect an operating system from kernel-mode
malware and rootkits. The protection works by stripping
away some of the kernel’s powers once the boot process
is done. We show how this protection can be applied
without incurring any runtime performance overhead.
• We demonstrate the practicability of the approach by inte-
grating the proposed protections into an emulated RISC-
V CPU, and by making minimal changes to the Linux
kernel to take advantage of these hardware protections.
We also show the hardware and energy overheads of the
additional hardware (a permission table) are minimal.
II. OPERATING SYSTEM KERNEL INTEGRITY
The security and trustworthiness of applications depend on
protections provided by the operating system. A malware that
is able to run at the same privilege level as the OS kernel
can gain full control of a system and even render malicious
activities invisible to the rest of the system. As a result,
software defenses or forensics techniques cannot reliably op-
erate on top of a compromised OS. Numerous protections are
continuously being introduced to harden operating systems
against attacks. These mitigations have made it significantly
harder to compromise modern operating systems.
This section provides an overview of the attack vectors
exploited by kernel-mode malware and rootkits, and describes
existing kernel protections and their limitations.
A. Kernel-Mode Execution and Rootkits
The most severe compromises on an operating system would
result in running arbitrary malicious code in kernel-mode (i.e.,
code that runs with kernel privileges). Some types of kernel-
level malware, referred to as rootkits can even hide their
existence and remain undetectable on the system [20].
Despite the increasing sophistication and volume of attacks
on the operating systems, kernel-mode malware and rootkits
need to fundamentally rely on one of these three techniques
to achieve privileged execution:
• Installing Malicious Drivers: This is one of the oldest and
most straightforward ways to run a malicious privileged
code. Drivers/kernel modules can potentially tamper with
any data in the system since they run at the same privilege
level as the kernel. Modern operating systems make mali-
cious driver installations difficult by requiring drivers to be
signed by a trusted key [2, 52].
• Privilege Escalation Attacks: Attackers have repeatedly
managed to discover mechanisms to leak or overwrite kernel
memory. These mechanisms range from exploiting memory
safety and integer overflow/underflow errors in kernel-mode
code [41, 48, 8], to exploiting race conditions [44, 54, 62],
to abusing hardware bugs [53]. Such exploits are convenient
for injecting code into kernel memory or for executing
user space code at an escalated privilege [15]. In addition
to exploits that function by corrupting or leaking kernel
memory, it has been shown that nearly all major operating
systems had the same bug in their system call handlers that
enabled directly running user space code in kernel-mode
[40]. Evidently, there are numerous avenues for privilege
escalation attacks.
Privilege escalation attacks are not mitigated by driver
signature checks as such attacks can inject code into kernel
space without passing through the driver loader logic. Fur-
thermore, privilege escalation bugs which allow overwriting
portions of kernel memory can themselves be used to disable
code signature checks [8].
Operating systems are too large and complex to completely
eliminate vulnerabilities that can lead to privilege escalation
attacks. As we will describe in the next section, modern
CPUs enable operating systems to restrict which code pages
can be executed in privileged mode. This hardware feature
makes privilege escalation attacks more challenging even in
the presence of certain vulnerabilities.
• Code Patching: It is also possible for attackers to modify
kernel code to redirect execution or bypass certain security
checks [20]. Since operating systems typically mark their
code as read-only once loaded into memory, such type of
code patching attacks need to rely on a bypass that enables
writes to protected code pages or files.
Rootkit Stealth Techniques. Once attackers introduce
malicious code into the system, they can employ additional
stealth techniques to hide their existence. This is achieved
by making network activities, processes, and files invisible to
user space programs. Techniques for achieving stealth can be
grouped into three categories [20]:
• System call and interrupt descriptor table hooking: On
a system call, the kernel consults the system call table
(also referred to as System Service Descriptor Table in
Windows ) to locate the kernel function that corresponds to
a system call. On some CPU architectures, both interrupts
and system calls are handled using a single dispatcher code.
On the other hand, on x86 CPUs, the kernel and the CPU
rely on the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) to execute the
kernel code that corresponds to a specific interrupt request.
System call tables and IDTs are essentially a list of function
addresses. Rootkits can overwrite entries in these tables to
execute malicious code on a system call or interrupt [20]. By
hijacking system calls and interrupts, attackers can control
what values the kernel returns to user space programs. For
example, a rootkit can hide a file or process by removing it
from a list that a system call returns to a user space program.
CPU architectures typically have a dedicated register that
stores addresses of kernel entry points for system call and
interrupt handling (e.g., on RISC-V, the stvec register typi-
cally holds the address of the kernel’s system call/interrupt
handler, while the IDTR register holds the address of the
IDT in x86). Since direct modification of system call tables
or the IDT might trigger certain rootkit detectors, some
rootkits create a new IDT or system call handler and
overwrite the address in these special purpose registers to
point to the new addresses [20].
• Hooking code pointers: It is relatively easier to detect
changes to pointers in the system call or interrupt descriptor
tables. As a result, advanced rootkits try to redirect execution
by hijacking dynamic code pointers in the kernel. Such type
of stealthy hooking is preferred by today’s advanced rootkits
[65] as detecting malicious changes to an arbitrary code
pointer is a more challenging task.
• Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM): A kernel
typically has various well-documented data structures to
track system information such as running processes/threads
and list of open network connections. Rootkits can manip-
ulate these data structures directly to make their execution
and network footprint invisible [20].
B. Shielding the Operating System from Attacks
Due to the prevalence and severity of attacks that target
operating systems, numerous techniques for protecting the
kernel have been extensively studied and deployed. In this
section, we will highlight these protections, and motivate the
necessity of the hardware extensions we propose in the next
section.
Secure Boot. Running a trustworthy operating system
requires that the system initially boots into an untampered
kernel. If the BIOS loads a compromised kernel, or if the
kernel loads a compromised driver, then all other protections
built into the operating system can be rendered ineffective.
Secure boot refers to a mechanism that verifies the integrity
of the BIOS and kernel to ensure the system boots into an
untampered state. This is achieved by deploying a digitally
signed or encrypted kernel and BIOS code, which the boot-
loader can later verify using the appropriate encryption key.
It is aimed at detecting modifications made prior to booting,
but provides no guarantees the operating system will remain
untampered once it starts running.
The protections we discuss below, and the protections we
propose in the next section, generally assume that a secure
boot mechanism ensures the system initially boots into an un-
tampered kernel. That being said, secure boot implementations
are certainly not impenetrable and can be vulnerable to certain
advanced attacks [9].
Driver Signing. Operating systems rely on driver signing
to prevent malicious drivers from being loaded into the system.
Recent versions of Microsoft Windows and macOS only allow
signed drivers by default [66, 2]. The Linux kernel also
supports kernel module signature verification.
Even if the widespread adoption of driver signing has made
it significantly harder to install malicious drivers, attackers
have repeatedly found ways to bypass this protection. Attacks
that disable code signing by exploiting a bug in the kernel or
a legitimate driver have been discovered in the wild [16, 8]
Furthermore, driver signing mechanisms cannot defend
against privilege escalation attacks (discussed above) since
those attacks avoid going through the driver loading mecha-
nism altogether and do not trigger any driver signature checks.
Supervisor Mode Access/Execution Prevention. In a
typical virtual memory system, a bit in the page table entries
(PTEs) marks a page as user-mode or kernel-mode page. The
CPU can use this bit to prevent user space programs from
accessing kernel memory.
Modern CPUs provide another layer of page-based protec-
tion to prevent arbitrary user space code from executing with
escalated privileges. These CPUs check the user/supervisor
bit in the PTEs, and prevent code from a user-mode page
from being executed in kernel-mode. Intel’s Supervisor Mode
Execution Prevention (SMEP) [39] and ARM’s Privileged-
Execute-Never (PXN) [36] are two examples of this technol-
ogy.
Intel Supervisor Mode Access Prevention [39], another re-
lated protection, uses the user/supervisor bit in PTEs to prevent
the kernel from directly accessing user space memory. This
prevents the operating system from erroneously dereferencing
a pointer to a user space memory (which could potentially
contain malicious instructions or data set up by a user space
program).
These CPU extensions make privilege escalation attacks
quite challenging even in the presence of kernel bugs. These
protections, however, are under the full control of the operating
system itself. As a result, an oversight or bug in the kernel
could be exploited to disable these protections. Kemerlis et al.,
for example, have demonstrated how the fact that the Linux
kernel “mirrors” the entire physical memory in its own address
space can be abused to bypass SMEP and PXN [24]. Memory
safety bugs have also been exploited to circumvent PXN and
tamper with kernel data structures on Android [64].
More importantly, SMAP and SMEP can be disabled by
clearing a single bit in x86’s CR4 control register. As a
result, code-reuse attacks can be used to disable SMAP/SMEP
by modifying the value of the CR4 register [29, 57]. The
additional kernel integrity monitoring layers in Windows (dis-
cussed below) attempt to defend against this bypass technique
by monitoring the state of the CR4 register [66].
Kernel Integrity Monitoring and Enforcement. Elimi-
nating all potential vulnerabilities from an operating system
remains to be an elusive goal. Therefore, to safeguard the
kernel’s integrity even in the presence of vulnerabilities, cer-
tain operating systems (notably Microsoft Windows and some
Android distributions) provide an additional security layer for
monitoring/enforcing kernel integrity [5, 66].
64-bit versions of Microsoft Windows are protected by
PatchGuard – a Kernel Patch Protection2 mechanism that is
directly integrated into the kernel. PatchGuard periodically
scans kernel code, CPU control registers, and data structures
that are commonly targeted by malware and rootkits (e.g.,
interrupt descriptor tables, system service descriptor tables,
the kernel stack, and kernel configuration flags) [1, 66].
Unfortunately, kernel integrity protections that run at the
same privilege level as the kernel can be disabled by exploiting
a vulnerability in the kernel itself. As a result, PatchGuard has
been subject to attacks that relied on kernel exploits [1]. More
secure implementations run the integrity protection module in
a hardware-isolated environment – such as a separate virtual
machine or a TrustZone secure world (discussed below). Win-
dows 10 and Android distributions used by major vendors are
examples of commercial operating systems that have adopted
this approach.
Virtualization-Based Kernel Protection. Virtualization-
based kernel security solutions deploy the kernel in a virtual
machine (VM) running on top of a hypervisor. Since the
hypervisor has full control over VMs running on top of it,
powerful defenses can be implemented inside the hypervisor
or inside a separate VM. Defenses implemented in this manner
have an advantage over defenses built directly into the kernel
as the hypervisor and the different VMs are fully isolated by
the hardware – making them harder to attack.
Previous works have demonstrated how hypervisors can be
used to securely monitor activities in the guest OS [17, 22,
33], to detect code pointer hooking in the kernel [60], and
prevent malicious privileged code execution [55, 50].
Windows 10 has also recently introduced a virtualization-
based kernel protection scheme [66]. This protection enables
security-critical tasks such as driver integrity verification,
kernel integrity enforcement, and credential management to
run in a separate virtual machine that is fully isolated from the
Windows operating system. This isolation protects security-
critical processes from being compromised by a privileged
malicious code.
One challenge of virtualization-based security is that the
hypervisor itself has a non-trivial attack surface [5]. For in-
stance, multiple remote code execution and privilege escalation
vulnerabilities have been discovered in Microsoft Hyper-V in
2018 alone [46, 45, 43]. To counter this issue, additional
protections for defending the hypervisor itself have been
proposed [59, 58, 4]. A tiny hypervisor that is amenable to
manual audits and verification has also been presented in [55].
While these are all promising approaches, creating a fully
verified commercial hypervisor that is bug-free remains to be
a hard problem.
2Part of the original motivation for Windows’ kernel patch protection
feature was improving system stability by preventing unsafe changes to the
kernel even by non-malicious third-party programs, such device driver and
anti-virus software.
TABLE I
EXISTING OS KERNEL PROTECTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS/DRAWBACKS.
Protection (§II-B) Known Limitations or Drawbacks
Secure Boot Can be undermined by vulnerabilities in bootloader; provides no guarantees
the operating system will remain untampered once it starts running.
Driver/Kernel Module Signing Can be disabled by exploiting OS or driver vulnerability; cannot catch
privilege escalation attacks that do not directly load drivers
Supervisor Mode Execution/Access Prevention and Privileged Execute
Never
Run under the full control of the untrusted operating system
In-Kernel Integrity Monitoring Runs at the same privilege level as the untrusted kernel
Hardware-Isolated Integrity Monitoring Requires complex and high overhead software stacks (such as a hypervisor
and/or a separate trusted kernel), which are still prone to exploits in the
presence of software bugs.
Hardware-Level Kernel Memory Monitoring Implementations may require significant amount of new hardware, periodic
full memory scans, and periodic cache flushes. It is also challenging to
identify the semantic meaning of raw bytes in RAM without having access
to more information about the system’s state.
Aside from the security issues, running an OS in a virtual-
ized environment also incurs performance overheads of up to
30%, which is undesirable for certain deployments [26]. Fur-
thermore, a study on the Microsoft Windows’ virtualization-
based protection has shown that system calls from untrusted
applications can be up to 200x (2000%) slower as a result of
page table entry modifications the hypervisor needs to make
on each system call [63].
TrustZone-Isolated Protection. Some ARM CPUs imple-
ment TrustZone, a hardware extension that enables isolating
software and hardware components into secure and non-secure
worlds [38]. The hardware prevents the non-secure world from
accessing the resources of the secure world.
Ge et al. proposed using this hardware feature for protecting
kernel integrity monitors [18]. Android distributions deployed
by major vendors use this approach to isolate the kernel
integrity enforcement mechanisms from the main kernel [5,
7]. They leverage TrustZone’s capabilities by running the
main operating system (i.e., Android) in the non-secure world,
while running another lightweight (trusted) kernel in the secure
world. Security-critical tasks such as credential management
and integrity checking run on top of the trusted kernel, shielded
from the main operating system.
Protections based on TrustZone, or similar trusted execution
environment (TEE) are preferred over the virtualization-based
approach as TEE-based protections do not need to rely on a
large and complex hypervisor for isolation [5]. Nevertheless,
TEEs cannot fully thwart attacks against a vulnerable code
running in the hardware isolated secure-world, and attacks
have been demonstrated against multiple generations of mobile
TEEs [51, 7, 42, 6]. In fact, trusted kernels commercially de-
ployed in TEEs still lag behind mainstream operating systems
in terms of built-in exploit mitigations [7].
Hardware Mechanisms for Kernel Integrity. A number
of previous works have proposed relying on hardware exten-
sions or peripheral devices for monitoring the integrity of the
kernel [25, 4, 32, 28, 27, 34].
One category of the hardware-level defenses involves using
a hardware peripheral, typically attached to the PCI bus, to take
a snapshot of the physical memory [25, 34, 4]. The snapshot
is then analyzed to verify the kernel’s integrity. The hardware
peripheral could be a custom hardware [34], a GPU [25], or
a network interface card [4]
Repeatedly taking full memory snapshots can be slow and
expensive, especially on systems that have a large memory.
Furthermore, transient memory modifications that happen in
between snapshot intervals can be missed [32]. There is
another class of protections that avoid periodically taking
full memory snapshots, and instead monitor the memory bus
[27, 28, 32]. However, these bus snooping defenses require a
significant amount of new hardware, including a standalone
microcontroller that has its own private memory, DRAM
controller, and DMA engine. In addition, bus monitoring
hardware that only snoop the DRAM bus require periodic
cache flushes to ensure they see all changes to memory [28].
These hardware mechanisms are designed to be minimally
invasive by operating independent of the CPU. However, it is
challenging to identify the semantic meaning of raw bytes in
memory or on the data bus without having access to additional
information [21]. For example, reliably determining which
memory locations constitute the page table entries or interrupt
descriptor tables is quite challenging without looking at the
CPU’s control registers.
Limitations of Existing Defenses. The protections dis-
cussed in this section make compromising the OS or planting
a rootkit significantly more challenging. However, as we
have highlighted above, these defenses still suffer from a
number of limitations and implementation challenges. Table
II-B summarizes these limitations and challenges.
One common theme that can be seen is that a vulnerability
in the hypervisor, main kernel, or trusted (isolated) kernel can
undo any of the software-based protections. And such types of
system software are too large to be bug-free – a point which is
evident from the series of attacks we have highlighted above.
The protection we present in this work is aimed at pro-
tecting the kernel’s integrity even in the presence of driver or
kernel vulnerabilities. As we will describe in the next section,
the hardware extensions and software modifications required
by our protection are minimal, thereby reducing the attack
surface.
III. NEVERLAND: A HARDWARE EXTENSION FOR
SAFEGUARDING KERNEL INTEGRITY
The previous section discussed how existing OS protections
(implemented within a kernel, a hypervisor, or a trusted
execution environment) have repeatedly been subjected to
attacks as a result of their size and complexity. In this section,
we propose a light-weight, hardware-based protection that
enables operating system kernels to protect themselves against
tampering – even in the presence of software vulnerabilities.
The security approach we describe here, dubbed Neverland,
does not rely on hypervisors or additional kernels running
in trusted execution environments – thereby eliminating the
complex extra components required by existing protections.
Neverland’s protections work by stripping away the oper-
ating system’s ability to change values of specific memory
locations and configuration registers once the boot process is
complete. Security-critical memory locations, such as security
configuration flags, kernel code, and kernel read-only data, do
not generally need to be modified once the system is done
booting (there are exceptions to this, which we will discuss in
Section III-E ). Our proposed hardware can be configured at
boot time to prevent the introduction of any new privileged
code into the system once the kernel is initialized, and to
disable all writes (at the hardware level) to kernel code
and read-only data. Since even the kernel is prevented by
the hardware from modifying security-critical code, data, and
configurations, software vulnerabilities in the kernel cannot be
exploited to alter these memory locations.
We validated the efficacy of these protections by prototyp-
ing the hardware extensions in Spike (the official RISC-V
emulator) and running a minimally modified version of the
Linux kernel on the emulator. Our evaluations show that the
hardware extensions required by Neverland do not incur any
appreciable silicon or energy cost, and that integrating the
proposed protections does not incur any performance overhead
beyond the 10s - 100s of milliseconds that are required to setup
permissions at boot time.
A. Threat Model
We consider a threat model that is similar to what is
typically assumed by OS kernel protection mechanisms. We
rely on the existence of a secure boot mechanism that ensures
the system boots into an untampered kernel. However, we
assume the OS kernel itself could have exploitable software
vulnerabilities. The attacker’s aim is to use these vulnerabili-
ties to tamper with kernel code/data, to execute kernel-mode
malware, or to hide malicious activity.
B. Design and Implementation Overview
In this section, we present the ingredients that makeup
Neverland’s protection mechanisms. We explain why these
mechanisms reduce the operating system’s attack surface in
Section IV.
Write-Once Memory Regions. The kernel code and
certain critical data structures (e.g., system call tables, security
configuration flags) do not typically need to change once
the system is initialized. Even the OS does not need to
modify these data structures once they are initialized (there
are exceptions to this claim, which we will discuss in Section
III-E ).
Our hardware extensions enable the operating system to
disable all subsequent writes to selected regions of memory
that contain kernel code and security-critical static data –
regardless of page permissions or the software privilege
level. Furthermore, once these memory regions are marked as
read-only, they can be “locked” so that even the kernel cannot
revert these permissions. Marking a memory region as locked
+ read-only once it is initialized effectively turns it into a
“write-once” region.
Note that this write-once capability is entirely independent
of the virtual memory system. As a result, code/data written in
these locked regions will remain protected even if a vulnerabil-
ity in the kernel is exploited to make read-only pages writable,
or to make kernel pages accessible to user space programs. The
only way these “locked” and read-only memory regions can be
modified or freed is by rebooting the system. This protection
approach obviates the need to continuously run an integrity
checking thread or virtual machine, or the need to instrument
the kernel and redirect page permission management.
Non-Privileged-Code-Only Memory Regions. A kernel-
mode malware or rootkit will eventually need to execute its
own code with escalated privileges. Neverland’s second com-
ponent is targeted at preventing the introduction of arbitrary
privileged code into a system – even in the presence of
vulnerabilities in the OS or drivers.
Neverland enables us to mark certain regions of the physical
address space as containing kernel-mode code. All other
regions of memory cannot contain any kernel or driver
code (i.e., by default, memory regions are only accessible
in user-mode). The CPU cannot fetch code from a physical
memory location that is not marked as privileged while it is
running in kernel-mode – and vice-versa. Similar to the “write-
once” regions above, this invariant is enforced by a hardware
extension that is independent of the virtual memory system –
making it resilient to attacks even in the presence of operating
system bugs.
This feature has two crucial distinctions compared to the
Intel SMAP [39] and ARM PXN [36] features described in
the previous section :
• SMAP and PXN rely on page permission bits and are
under the total control of the operating system. As a
result, a flaw in the operating system can be exploited
to bypass these features [24, 29, 57]. On the other hand,
the non-privileged-code-only memory region proposed
here tracks permissions of physical addresses (instead of
relying the OS’s virtual memory system) and relies on
a hardware-managed table that is largely independent of
the OS.
• Once memory locations are categorized as privileged-
code and non-privileged-code-only regions (preferably
immediately after the kernel finishes booting), the per-
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Fig. 1. Example Memory Layout and Physical Memory Permissions. Neverland enforces “write-once” and non-privileged-code-only restrictions by using a
hardware table that stores permissions associated with protected physical address ranges. These permissions are enforced independent of the page permissions
maintained by the OS. The permission table shown in (b) illustrates how the memory layout shown in (a) can be protected. For example, kernel code and
read-only data are marked as read-only and locked. Once the locked bit for a permission entry is set to 1, even the operating system (or a malicious privileged
code) cannot revert the permission entry until system restart. Hence, marking an initialized memory region as read-only + locked turns it into a “write-once”
region. Note that virtually contiguous memory locations may not be necessarily be stored in a physically contiguous manner and as a result, we might need
multiple permission entries for those regions.
missions can be locked from subsequent changes – even
by the most privileged software in the system.
This feature, combined with write-once memory regions can
be used to ensure all memory regions that contain privileged
code cannot be patched, even by the OS or malicious drivers.
Conversely, we can also ensure that writable memory regions
can only contain non-privileged code. This configuration is
illustrated in Figure 1. We can set kernel and driver code
as “locked” since they do not typically need to change once
loaded into memory. In short, flagging memory regions as
locked or non-privileged-code-only makes it extremely hard
to introduce new malicious privileged code into the system.
Locking Memory Permission Registers. The write-
once and the non-privileged-code-only memory restrictions are
specified using permission configuration registers (discussed
below). The values of these configuration registers are intended
to be set at boot time to minimize the attack surface.
After their values have been set, the ability to lock these per-
mission registers against any modification would significantly
improve the security of the system. If these configurations are
not locked, vulnerabilities in the OS can be exploited to reset
them – similar to attacks that disable SMAP/SMEP defenses
by resetting control registers [29, 57].
Locking Configuration Status Registers. The CPU de-
termines the location of interrupt descriptor tables (IDTs) and
system call dispatchers using values stored in configuration
registers. An attacker can trick the CPU into executing arbi-
trary code by overwriting the addresses stored in these registers
(provided the attacker has already injected code to be executed
into the kernel memory or has bypassed SMEP/PXN).
To provide an additional layer of security, existing kernel
integrity mechanisms such as PatchGuard and HyperGuard
[66] monitor configuration registers to detect malicious modi-
fications. Instead of continuously monitoring changes to these
registers in software, “hardware-locking” them from subse-
quent modification provides better security while eliminating
the additional monitoring overhead. We discuss how register
locking can be implemented in hardware in Section III-C.
Permission Tables. The memory protections described
above require a lightweight hardware to be integrated into
the CPU. This additional hardware will maintain a small
memory permission table that contains the physical address
ranges and their associated permission bits. Permission bits
specify whether a memory range is writable or “privileged-
executable”. A third permission bit is used to “lock” the
permission entry (as discussed above). Figure 1b shows what
the permission table’s contents would look like for protection
setup shown in Figure 1a.
A number of embedded CPU architectures support a form
of memory permission tables. For example, the ARM Memory
Protection Unit (MPU) and the RISC-V Physical Memory
Protection (PMP) scheme are optional components that can
be used to enforce permissions on physical addresses[61,
37]. They are a preferred mechanism for implementing a
lightweight memory protection scheme in low-resource mi-
crocontrollers that do not have virtual memory support [3,
13]. These extensions, however, are not typically implemented
by CPUs that have virtual memory support. Neverland uses a
variation of such tables for enforcing memory permissions. We
leverage immutable hardware tables and registers to provide
low-overhead operating system protections.
We will dive into the details of the hardware implementation
in the next section.
Permission Initialization and Enforcement. A kernel-
mode code configures the permission tables immediately after
all kernel code and read-only data are loaded into memory. If a
memory region is covered by multiple overlapping permission
entries, the most restrictive set of permissions are enforced. To
prevent an attacker from specifying additional privileged code
regions, unused permission entries must be locked as shown in
the last row of Figure 1b. Initializing permissions immediately
after secure boot, and locking any unused permission entries
takes away the attacker’s ability to load arbitrary kernel-mode
code.
What Memory Regions Are Protected? Neverland is
ideal for protecting security-critical code and data that are
loaded or set once (preferably at boot time), and do not need
to change once the system is running. A typical configuration
for protecting an OS would be composed of the following set
of permissions, which are to be set immediately after the OS
is done loading code and data into memory:
• Core kernel code (text section): privileged, read-only,
executable, locked
• Read-only kernel data (RO section): privileged, read-only,
locked
• System call table: privileged, read-only, locked
• Interrupt descriptor table (on x86): read-only, locked
• Kernel Configuration (e.g., code signing enforcement
configurations):
privileged, read-only, locked
• Driver / loadable kernel module code: privileged, read-
only, executable, locked
Note that the code and data regions listed above are controlled
or periodically scanned by a kernel integrity mechanism such
as PatchGuard and HyperGuard [66]. The ability to irreversibly
disable writes (until system restart) to these regions eliminates
the need to monitor these regions using a continuously running
software.
On the Linux kernel, the kernel code (text) and read-only
data sections are typically stored in a physically contiguous
region. So we will only need one permission entry for each.
Even a 5-entry permission table would be sufficient to protect
the critical components of the core kernel listed above.
On the other hand, loadable kernel modules/drivers are not
loaded in a physically contiguous memory region, and as a
result, protecting them would require dozens of entries in
the permission table. This is undesirable as having a large
hardware table incurs high overhead and cost. We will discuss
how we tackle this challenge in Section III-D.
Function Pointers. As discussed in the previous section,
function pointers in the operating system could be overwritten
by rootkits to hijack execution of system calls or driver code
[65]. Function pointers that are typically hooked by rootkits
rarely change their values once they are initialized [60]. Nev-
erland could be used to lock such function pointers after they
are initialized. Wang et al. have shown such function pointers
can be relocated to dedicated read-only pages [60]. Their
pointer relocation approach can be leveraged by Neverland to
prevent malicious function pointer hooking. However, function
pointers that need be updated multiple times while the system
is running cannot be locked by Neverland.
C. Hardware Requirements
As highlighted above, the main additional component that
is required is a table that stores and enforces the physical
memory permissions. Each permission entry needs to store
three pieces of information (Figure 1b):
• The physical address range (start and end address) for the
memory region
• Privileged bit: if this bit is not set to 1, the CPU cannot
read data or fetch code from this physical memory range
while executing in privileged mode. By default, all memory
regions are non-privileged – regardless of page permis-
sions.
• Execute bit: the CPU can only fetch kernel-mode code when
this bit is set to 1. However, the CPU is still allowed to fetch
user-mode code even when this execute bit is set to 0 (i.e.,
user-mode code execution is enforced by page permission
set by the OS).
• Write bit: If this bit is set to zero, even the OS cannot write
to this memory region, regardless of page permissions.
• Locked bit: After this bit is set, the operating system cannot
make any modifications to this permission entry.
• Valid bit (optional): this indicates a permission entry has
been fully initialized. Writes to the permission registers may
not be atomic; hence this bit can be used to make it easier
for the software to prevent the hardware from enforcing
a permission entry before it is fully initialized. Note that
enforcing a partially initialized permission may prevent the
operating system from resuming execution.
The hardware consults permissions in this table on each L1
cache access. If there are overlapping address ranges in the
list of permissions, we enforce the most restrictive ones.
Register Locking. As mentioned above, to prevent any
additional modifications to a permission entry or a configura-
tion status register, the kernel can set the lock bit associated
with that register. We can use the lock bit to mask the “write-
enable” input of the register. This mechanism is shown in
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Fig. 2. Register Locking. The lock bit can be used to mask the write enable
input. Once locked, the register can only be overwritten after resetting the
system.
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Fig. 3. Performing Permission Check in Parallel with Cache Access. After
the virtual-to-physical address translation is completed, performing tag search
and cache line access requires additional cycles (typically ∼ 4 cycles). This
time window can be used to perform permission checks without impacting
the cache access latency. The above figure illustrates the case where we have
both an L1 cache hit and a TLB hit.
Figure 2. The only way to reset these registers once they are
locked is to reboot the system.
Eliminating Additional Memory Latency.
The kernel integrity enforcement scheme we are proposing
requires a permission check operation on every data and
instruction fetch. Therefore, it is essential that the permission
lookup process does not stall the CPU lest it will incur
overheads on every cache read operation.
Keeping Permission Tables Small. To do quick permission
lookups, we need to keep the hardware table small. Searching
through a hardware maintained table will be slower and more
expensive (in terms of energy consumption and silicon cost)
as the size of the table grows.
If the security-critical kernel memory regions are spread
across numerous physically non-contiguous memory regions,
then we will need a large permission table to protect them.
To protect the operating system using a small, high-speed
permission table, we make minor modifications to the kernel to
store the regions that need to be protected by Neverland within
a limited number of physically contiguous memory locations.
These software modifications are discussed later in Section
III-D. In our evaluations, an 8-entry table was quite sufficient
to protect all critical memory regions in the Linux kernel. Our
evaluations also show that such small tables can be integrated
into high-frequency CPUs without impacting cycle-time, and
can be searched within 3 CPU cycles (Section V-A).
Parallelizing Permission Lookups. The permission checks
can be timed in a manner that ensures the extra cycles that
are required to search the table do not stall the CPU. Figure 3
illustrates the operations involved in a cache access. Initially,
the CPU issues a virtual address it wants to access. This
address is translated to a physical address using the translation
lookaside buffer (TLB). On high-performance CPUs, portions
of virtual address bits are used to initiate cache access – in
parallel with the address translation process (more formally,
the virtual address is used to index into the tag and data
arrays). Once the address translation process is done, the
physical address is used to search the tags and select the
appropriate data array.
As it can be seen in the timing diagram in Figure 3, once the
physical address is returned by the TLB, there is time window
at the end in which the cache performs tag comparisons
and reads the appropriate cache line. The physical memory
permissions can be read in parallel with this last operation
– without stalling the CPU. On today’s high-performance
CPUs, the tag-compare and data-access operations in the L1
cache take ∼ 4 CPU cycles [19]. The results we present in
Section V show that this 4-cycle time window is enough to
perform physical address permission lookups in parallel. As a
result, Neverland’s protections do not incur any performance
overheads.
On CPUs without virtually indexed caches (i.e., that do
not overlap cache and TLB lookup ), it is relatively more
straightforward to do permission lookup in parallel with cache
access as the tag-search and data-array-select operations take
even longer.
D. Supporting Loadable Kernel Modules
Modern operating systems need to support a vast array of
platforms and peripherals. Compiling the kernel with all the
drivers or OS extensions that will ever be required would result
in an extremely bloated operating system.
To that end, operating systems typically allow drivers to
be implemented as separate kernel modules that can be dy-
namically linked to the kernel as necessary. The core kernel
loads all the modules that are required to run the OS on the
target hardware configuration. On a typical Linux machine, for
example, there could be 10s or 100s of kernel modules that
need to be loaded into the system (on a laptop we edited this
section on, for example, a total of 171 kernel modules were
automatically loaded at boot time).
Loadable kernel modules present a challenge to Neverland’s
memory protection mechanisms. In addition to protecting
the core kernel, Neverland needs to protect the text (code)
section and security-critical data of all loaded kernel modules
– which are going to be loaded at arbitrary, physically
non-contiguous memory addresses. This fragmentation is
illustrated in Figure 4. Each of the potentially 100s of modules
loaded into the system could have code and data that span
multiple virtual pages that are not physically contiguous.
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Fig. 4. “Defragmenting” Kernel Module Code. The code sections of
loadable kernel modules are placed in numerous physically non-contiguous
memory regions. As a result, protecting them directly would require numerous
entries in the permission table. To avoid the need for large hardware tables,
we re-arrange the physical memory layout and place all the kernel modules’
code sections in a physically contiguous region. This enables us to protect
all code sections using a single entry in the permission table. The algorithm
we present in Section III-D can be used to “defragment” any kernel-mode
code/data that needs to be protected by Neverland.
If Neverland ends up maintaining a large table with 100s
of entries, then the permission lookup operation will be slow
– which incurs performance overheads. Furthermore, having
large permission tables will be impractical in CPUs used by
mobile and embedded devices – due to their cost and energy
constraints.
Rearranging Physical Memory Layout. To enable Nev-
erland to support any number of kernel modules in a scalable
manner, we need to modify the kernel module loader logic.
In this work, we modified the loadable kernel loader in the
Linux kernel so that all text (code) sections from loadable
kernel modules will be laid out on a physically contiguous
memory region. Although the modifications and results we
present in this work are in the context of the Linux kernel, the
algorithm presented here can be adopted into any other OS.
Furthermore, the same algorithm can be used to contiguously
store memory allocated by any kernel subsystem.
The steps taken by our algorithm for laying out kernel
modules is illustrated in Figure 4 and is summarized below:
• Step 1: Allocate a large physically contiguous region
before any kernel module is loaded (or at boot time).
The size of this contiguous region can be configured as a
kernel parameter, and can be made arbitrarily large since
any unused portions will be freed at the end.
• Step 2: for each loadable kernel module:
– Step 2.1: Load kernel modules using the regular flow.
We do not need to modify the core logic for linking
and loading kernel modules.
– Step 2.2: Copy the content of the pages we want to
protect to the physically contiguous region.
– Step 2.3: Overwrite page table entries (PTEs) for
the copied pages so that the PTEs point to a physical
address in the physically contiguous region.
– Step 2.4: Flush TLB to ensure the hardware will see
the modifications to the kernel’s PTEs.
– Step 2.5: Free the old physical page frames.
• Step 3: Free any unused memory from the physically
contiguous pool, after all modules have been loaded.
At the end of the above operations, the virtual address space
remains unchanged, and as a result, the rest of the kernel does
not need to be modified to support these changes.
As we will detail in the next section, all loadable kernel
modules and drivers will have to be loaded at boot time for
the system to fully benefit from Neverland’s protections.
E. Restrictions on Kernel Features
To benefit from the maximum security guarantees afforded
by Neverland, the kernel must mark all privileged code read-
only, and also lock the permission table entries. Such tight
restrictions can go against some legitimate system features. In
this section, we identify four such features and explain how
they are affected by Neverland.
Runtime Kernel Module and Driver Loading. Driver
software and kernel modules are typically loaded into a system
at boot time. Most operating systems, however, allow drivers
or kernel modules to be loaded at any arbitrary time after the
system is done booting.
To allow drivers to be loaded anytime while the OS is
running, Neverland’s “non-privileged-code-only” restrictions
on memory regions must be disabled. This weakens the secu-
rity guarantees provided by Neverland. Therefore, to ensure
maximum security, it is desirable to require all necessary
kernel modules to be loaded at boot time, and then lock all
privileged code regions from additional modification. With this
restriction, the system must be restarted when a driver needs
to be updated or installed.
Requiring a restart on OS or driver update will only be a
slight inconvenience for regular users, especially on mobile
and desktop devices, as all necessary drivers and kernel
modules are typically loaded at boot time; and restarting the
system on OS and driver updates is already a common practice.
On Android systems, for example, it is already a recommended
practice to load all required kernel modules in one pass when
the kernel is initialized (for improved performance) [31].
Self-Modifying Code and Just-in-Time Compilation.
Most modern CPUs allow pages to be marked non-executable.
A typical page that contains code is marked read-only and ex-
ecutable, whereas all other pages are set to be non-executable.
However, supporting self-modifying code or just-in-time
compilers requires code pages to be writable at least tem-
porarily – which can potentially expose the system to code
injection attacks. To protect a system from injection of kernel-
mode code, a Windows 10 system protected by Microsoft’s
Device Guard does not allow drivers to dynamically allocate
executable pages [66]. Neverland’s protections can be enabled
on such restrictive systems without requiring significant mod-
ifications.
Modern Linux distributions, however, support an in-kernel
just-in-time compiler, known as eBPF (extended BSD Packet
Filter), that enables user space programs to run sandboxed
bytecode in kernel-mode. This feature is an extension of the
original BSD Packet Filter system that enables high-speed
packet filtering by avoiding expensive copies and context
switches between user and kernel-mode [30].
In-kernel JITs such as eBPF, cannot properly function with
the strict configuration presented in the previous sections.
However, some of these restrictions can be relaxed to allow
in-kernel JITs. Instead of making all privileged-code regions
unwritable, Neverland can be configured to allow writes to a
fixed, pre-allocated executable memory region that is used by
the in-kernel JITs only. All other privileged code (core kernel
and driver code) will still be unwritable until a system reset.
It is conceivable that an attacker could find a bug that
would allow code-injection into the fixed memory region that
is explicitly pre-allocated for the in-kernel JIT. However, even
with only portions of the privileged code regions marked as
write-once, Neverland would still make privilege escalation
attacks significantly harder compared to a system that only
relies on page permissions.
Live Kernel Patching. To avoid the need to restart a server
on an OS update, some operating systems support live kernel
patching (also called hot patching) – whereby parts of the
kernel code can be overwritten without restarting the system
[23, 66]. The protections introduced in this paper, by design,
disallow modification of kernel code once the boot process is
done. This effectively makes live kernel patching illegal.
On a cloud deployment, the hypervisor and/or host OS can
be protected using Neverland, and still allow guest operating
systems to be live patched. Patching a Neverland protected
kernel that is directly running on the hardware, however, will
require a system reboot.
Kernel live patching is not a critical feature on desktop and
mobile systems, and as such Neverland’s protections will not
introduce significant usability issues.
In Summary... Neverland’s full kernel protections can be
readily adopted on mobile, embedded, and desktop platforms
as these machines do not need to load new drivers frequently,
do not need to rely on in-kernel JITs, and can usually be
restarted when the OS or drivers need to be updated.
On certain server deployments, however, enabling the full
set of defenses we presented would require either disabling
features such as live kernel patching and privileged JITs, or
relaxing some of the restrictions (e.g., allowing the OS to
update some privileged code regions).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As discussed in Section II-B, numerous defenses have been
proposed to harden operating systems against attacks. Among
these defenses, Neverland requires secure boot and driver
signature verification to ensure that a tampered kernel or a
malicious driver is not loaded before the memory permission
tables are initialized. Neverland cannot provide reliable protec-
tion if the attacker compromises the secure boot chain before
the permission table is initialized.
Table II highlights how Neverland helps protect against
existing attack vectors and stealth techniques. It can be seen
from the table that Neverland’s hardware controlled memory
permissions are effective at thwarting most attack vectors.
The two exceptions are code pointer hooking and direct
kernel object manipulation. Indefinitely locking arbitrary code
pointers and kernel objects from modifications is not feasible
since the operating system might need to update them as the
state of the system changes. As a result, an attacker could still
hook code pointers or leverage code-reuse techniques such
as return-oriented-programming [56] to maliciously modify
kernel objects on a system protected by Neverland.
Even if Neverland cannot be used to directly protect dy-
namic kernel objects and pointers, the fact that it can totally
disable any unauthorized privileged execution makes it hard to
meaningfully manipulate these unprotected pointers and data
structures. The attacker will need to purely rely on code-reuse
attacks to modify desired memory regions. Furthermore, after
hooking code pointers, the attacker cannot redirect them to
new privileged code, but only to existing kernel/driver code.
Operating systems can also use Neverland to “lock” ker-
nel configuration flags, such as driver signature enforcement
configurations – which are data structures typically targeted
by kernel exploits [8, 16]. Hence, the protections we have
presented in this work significantly limit what the attacker
can achieve by way of kernel exploits.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluated the effectiveness and practicality of Neverland
by adding the defenses presented above to a RISC-V system.
We extended Spike, the official RISC-V ISA emulator [49],
with the proposed hardware extensions. We modified the
Linux kernel to i) initialize the permission tables, ii) lock
the configuration registers which store the addresses of the
trap handlers (mtvec and stvec registers on RISC-V), and iii)
defragment loadable kernel modules. RISC-V already has an
(optional) ISA extension for physical memory protection [61]
– which is an approach typically used as a replacement to
page-based permissions on low-resource microcontrollers [3,
13]. Hence, we use those instructions to write to the permission
registers. On other architectures, the registers in the permission
table could be programmed through a memory-mapped I/O.
We were able to boot a fully functional 64-bit Linux-
based system with BusyBox 1.26.2 utilities [10] on the Spike
emulator with these protections in place. This validates that a
stock kernel (with minor modifications) can run with portions
of its memory completely locked-down by the hardware.
We initialize the permission table once the kernel is fully
initialized and read-only page permissions are set up by the
kernel. In the remainder of this section, we evaluate the
overheads associated with these changes.
TABLE II
EFFECTIVENESS OF NEVERLAND’S PROTECTIONS. NEVERLAND’S HARDWARE CONTROLLED MEMORY PERMISSIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AT A
PROTECTING AGAINST MOST OS ATTACK VECTORS. CODE POINTER HOOKING AND DIRECT KERNEL OBJECT MANIPULATION (VIA CODE-REUSE
ATTACKS), HOWEVER, ARE NOT THWARTED BY NEVERLAND.
Attacks (see Section II-A) Protection by Neverland
Syscall Table (SSDT) and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooking [20] Full Protection: tables unwritable after boot
Configuration (Model Specific) Register Hooking [20] Full Protection: registers that hold system call and interrupt entry points are
locked after boot
Runtime Code Patching [20] Full Protection: text sections are locked; no privileged code can exist outside
of the locked area
Code Pointer Hooking [65] Limited Protection: kernel pointers that need to change overtime cannot
be locked; an attacker can hook these pointers, but they can only point to
existing kernel code (i.e., cannot point to new attacker injected code).
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) [20] Limited Protection: objects that need to be updated over time cannot
be locked; an attacker can use code-reuse attacks or exploit memory
management bugs to overwrite objects.
Malicious Drivers [20] Full Protection: no new privileged code can be loaded after boot
Privilege Escalation (User space to Kernel space ) (§II-A) Full Protection: no code outside the locked region can execute with kernel
privileges
A. Hardware Overhead
The only additional hardware that is necessary for locking-
down memory locations is the permission table and the per-
mission check hardware.
To measure permission lookup latency and the hardware
cost, we implemented a permission table and lookup logic in
RTL and used the Synopsis Design Compiler to synthesize the
designs to the IBM 45nm silicon-on-insulator (SOI) technol-
ogy library.
Speed. We were able to clock our synthesized permission
table at frequencies as high as 3.83 GHz on a 45nm library.
For comparison, the highest peak frequency available on a
45nm Intel CPU is 3.73GHz [14]. This confirms permission
tables can be integrated even in high-frequency CPUs without
affecting speed. 45nm is a relatively older technology node,
but this comparison holds true on newer silicon technology as
well since both the permission table and rest of the CPU scale
in a similar manner.
Furthermore, using this design, it is possible to perform a
lookup in a 16-entry permission table in just 3 cycles. And as
described in Section III-C, this 3 cycle table lookup can be
performed in parallel with the tag comparison and data array
access – without incurring any performance overhead.
Hardware Area and Energy. Table V-A lists the estimated
power and area overheads of permission tables synthesized
with different sizes. We present the overheads normalized
with respect to i) a 40nm, dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 (a CPU
targeted at low-power, cost-sensitive embedded systems [35]),
ii) a single-core 45nm, RISC-V BOOM with no L2 cache (a
CPU that targets similar device classes as the Cortex-A9), and
iii) a 45nm, Intel Core i5 (a desktop-class CPU). The power
and area of the two baseline embedded/mobile CPUs is based
on the data from [11], while the corresponding estimates for
the permission tables are based on a 45nm synthesis result
at a target frequency of 1.5GHz. The baseline power and die
size for the desktop-class CPU was acquired from the Core
i5-760 datasheet, while its corresponding permission table is
synthesized with a target frequency of 3.8GHz. The estimates
account for 2 permission tables per core – one for the I-cache
and a second one for the D-cache.
The results show that adding 8-entry permission tables even
on low-end embedded CPUs such as the Cortex-A9 incurs
minimal overhead – 1.11% area overhead and 3.2% power
overhead. These estimates are pessimistic as the permission
tables are not synthesized to energy optimized process. These
overheads will be even lower on CPUs that do not merely
target low-end devices. On smaller CPUs such as the BOOM
or Cortex-A5, adding more than 4-entry permission tables
(without power optimizations) would result in a sizable power
overhead.
B. Performance Overhead
The evaluation above indicates that permission lookups,
which are performed on each L1 cache access will not degrade
system performance. In addition to the hardware extension,
however, we made two additions to the kernel code, namely
packing the text section of loadable kernel modules and
setting up the permission table at boot time. We evaluate
the performance impact of these kernel modifications on boot
latency below. Note that these two modifications only impact
the boot latency as they only need to be executed once on
system startup.
1) Kernel Module Loading: At the time of this project,
the upstream RISC-V Linux port (v. 4.14) did not yet fully
support dynamically loadable kernel modules. Hence, we
validated our kernel module packing scheme and characterized
its performance on an x86 64 system. We implemented the
algorithm described in Section III-D in version 4.14 of the
kernel, and run it on a KVM virtual machine.
To measure the additional latency incurred on kernel module
loading as a result of moving code pages, we compiled and
loaded kernel modules with different code sizes. The results
are presented in Table V-B1. The results demonstrate that
relocating even 100s of KBs of code pages incurs < 1.5ms
overhead.
TABLE III
POWER AND AREA OVERHEAD OF PERMISSION TABLES. OVERHEADS NORMALIZED WITH RESPECT TO A 40NM DUAL-CORE ARM CORTEX-A9 (A
CPU TARGETED AT LOW-POWER, COST-SENSITIVE EMBEDDED SYSTEMS), A SINGLE-CORE 45NM RISC-V BOOM CPU WITH NO L2 CACHE, AND A
45NM QUAD-CORE DESKTOP-CLASS INTEL CORE I5-760 CPU. THE ESTIMATES FOR THE MOBILE CPUS ARE PESSIMISTIC AS THE PERMISSION TABLES
ARE NOT SYNTHESIZED TO A POWER-OPTIMIZED PROCESS NODE.
No. of Entries Normalized Area Overhead Normalized Power Overhead
(per core) BOOM Cortex-A9 Core i5 BOOM Cortex-A9 Core i5
4 x 2 0.67% 0.59% 0.016% 4.29% 1.79% 0.07%
8 x 2 1.26% 1.11% 0.032% 7.69% 3.20% 0.13%
16 x 2 2.39% 2.10% 0.062% 14.18% 5.91% 0.23%
TABLE IV
MODULE LOAD LATENCY OVERHEAD INCURRED BY
DEFRAGMENTATION.
Module Load Time
Code Size Baseline Packed Text Overhead
Section
128KB 4.86 ms 5.89 ms 1.03 ms
256KB 5.15 ms 6.27 ms 1.13 ms
512KB 5.91 ms 7.28 ms 1.37 ms
1MB 7.32 ms 8.67 ms 1.35 ms
2) Initializing Permission Registers: After the boot process
is completed (including kernel module packing), we need to
write the appropriate permissions to the hardware table. When
booting the Linux kernel on a single emulated core in the
Spike emulator, writing the addresses and permissions to the
hardware table only introduced an additional 270µs latency
on the boot process. We expect the latency to be even lower
on real hardware that does not have the emulation overhead.
Note that the initialization needs to be done on every core on
a multicore system – similar to any other configuration status
registers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a hardware mechanism for
thwarting kernel-mode malware and rootkits. Our approach
prevents runtime modification of the kernel’s critical code/data
by locking them at the hardware level once the boot process
is complete. Creating a full-fledged kernel-mode malware or
rootkit by relying entirely on code-reuse attacks and kernel
object manipulation is challenging. Hence, taking away the
ability to execute malicious kernel-mode code or to ability
modify static kernel data significantly limits the attacker’s
facilities.
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